A substantial body of literature has documented impressive total factor productivity (TFP) growth in China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the period of China's enterprise reform. Such growth rates have been used to support the view that China's reforms of SOEs have been highly successful. In this paper, we question the validity of using TFP growth rates as a ''bottom line'' measure of performance. In the spirit of a counterexample, we use a simple model to show that when firms are not profit maximizers for whatever reason, higher productivity may actually lead to greater allocative distortion, lower profits, and lower economic efficiency. On the basis of existing evidence, we argue that these conditions held for many Chinese state enterprises during the reform.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we examine the use of enterprise-level productivity, or enterprise-level total factor productivity (TFP), as an ultimate or ''bottom-line'' measure of performance in studies of state enterprise reform during the transition. We do not address an issue often in dispute that some studies comprising the large body of existing TFP research contain biased estimates of TFP growth. Nor are we concerned solely with explaining why enterprise productivity measures and accounting profitability measures give conflicting indications of enterprise performance, although our results indicate such cases will occur. Our principal argument, presented in the spirit of a counterexample using a simple model, is that when state enterprises do not have profit maximization as their primary objective for whatever reason, a higher TFP may lead to lower economic profit and thus possibly also lower economic efficiency. Conditions are identified under which this situation occurs. Thus, TFP can be a misleading measure or indicator of state enterprise performance during the reform period.
This research is motivated by a massive body of literature arising during the past decade devoted to the study of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the reform era. Previous work documents numerous efforts to estimate productivity growth of SOEs. While controversies exist regarding the accuracy of such measurements, 2 most findings indicate impressive productivity gains (from 2 to 6%) realized by SOEs since the inception of the reforms in the early 1980's.
3 Indeed, these results lead many students of the Chinese economy to conclude that China's SOE reforms were largely successful. Jefferson and Singh (1993, p. 30 ) echo the conventional wisdom on this issue. ''Have state-owned enterprises improved their performance? Yes, most analyses of productivity growth within state industry show that TFP has accelerated over the pre-reform period.'' Within China, however, perceptions do not indicate that the reforms of SOEs were successful. To the contrary, year after year the general public, research economists, and reform-minded government leaders have complained about mounting problems within the SOEs. Aggregate statistics support these complaints; in excess of 30% of the state firms incur explicit financial losses and are increasingly reliant on government subsidies (Bai and Wang, 1996) .
Many SOEs have difficulty competing in the product market, resulting in a debt crisis in the financial sector. By 1994, the total amount of nonperforming debt was as high as 20% of GDP . A recent speech by the economic Premier Zhu Rongji (Zhu, 1996 , p. 1) addresses this phenomenon. ''The current problems of SOEs are: excessive investments in fixed assets with very low return rates, resulting in the sinking of large amounts of capital; low sales-to-production ratio giving rise to mounting inventories. The end result is that the state has to inject an increasing amount of working capital through the banking sector into the SOEs.'' In response to these persistent problems, Chinese leaders have recently placed enterprise reform at the top of the reform agenda. 4 In this paper, we do not present new estimates of TFP nor do we debate the reliability of reported productivity gains in China's state sector. Instead, we question the validity of using productivity growth as an index of efficiency improvement in SOEs. Using a simple model in the spirit of a counterexample, we argue that measured growth of TFP may be a misleading indicator of SOE performance given significant nonprofit objectives of SOEs. TFP is a valid index of performance within the context of profit-maximizing firms. However, SOEs under reform are not profit maximizers; in fact, the very reason for the reform is that a typical SOE has many nonprofit objectives.
The logic of our argument is as follows. Efficiency is determined by both the firm's technology and its operating decisions. An increase in productivity leads to a higher marginal rate of transforming input into output; i.e., the firm has a larger feasible set of operations. The question, which is a behavioral issue, becomes how do these improvements in technology affect the firm's choice of output level. When a firm is a profit maximizer, its behavior ensures that higher productivity always leads to improved social welfare and higher efficiency. When the objective of the manager differs from that of profit maximization, however, higher productivity can induce distorted behavior that partially or totally offsets efficiency gains from improved technology. Therefore, TFP growth rates cannot be taken automatically to imply improvements in social welfare and efficiency. For example, when the manager of a firm is biased toward increasing output, high productivity may induce the manager to deviate further from the profit-maximizing output level. As we demonstrate later, if the firm's output bias is sufficiently strong, an increase in productivity can lead to lower profit and, with additional qualifications, lower efficiency. Evidence exists that this higher productivity and lower efficiency scenario characterizes recent developments in China's state sector. Section 2 of this paper presents our basic model. Section 3 analyzes how a higher TFP growth rate alters the decisions of a non-profit-maximizing state enterprise. Section 4 investigates empirically the relevance of our analysis. A brief summary is given in Section 5.
A SIMPLE MODEL
In this section, we present the simplest model of productivity growth and firm behavior that will serve our purpose of constructing a counterexample to the popular notion that productivity growth is identical to improvement of enterprise performance.
Assume that the firm's production function is
where x is the input, Q the output, and A a measure of productivity. By most conventional definitions, an increase in A corresponds to an increase in TFP.
In most empirical work, measuring enterprise-level TFP involves estimating the production function and identifying TFP with A. Thus, growth of TFP is equal to growth in A. 5 To reiterate, we are not questioning whether existing works have misestimated TFP. Rather, we are concerned with the appropriateness of the TFP index itself using its conventional definition.
The production function, f(x), is assumed to be strictly concave so that f(r) ú 0 and fЉ(r) õ 0. 6 The profit of the firm is given by
where w is the price of input x and the output price is normalized at 1. This implies that
is the firm's maximum profit for any given output level. Define
5 One exception is Gordon and Li (1995) , who implement the TFP index by Kendrick (1973) ,
, where g i is equated to the marginal product in the base year. Our theory does not address this approach. 6 A given firm eventually faces decreasing returns to scale because some inputs cannot be varied easily with the firm's scale. For example, as output increases, the manager's capacity to operate eventually becomes overloaded and his productivity falls. Hiring additional managers results in incentive problems as discussed by Williamson (1975) .
Maximum profit, again at a given output level, is thus
Note that, since f(x) is strictly concave, c(Q/A) is strictly convex so that it is increasingly more costly to produce the next unit of output, i.e., c(r) ú 0 and cЉ(r) ú 0. An important component of the model is the determination of the objective function of the firm. Many authors argue that SOEs have an impetus to expand their size. For example, Kornai (1992) emphasizes that SOE managers are embedded in a bureaucratic hierarchy, in which the size of the firm or its output level is a proxy for managerial status. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that managers are influenced by politicians whose political agenda dictates increasing firm size and output. Without loss of generality, we make a simple assumption that the SOE manager maximizes a linear combination of profit and output; i.e., we assume that the objective function of the firm is given by
where b § 0 is a measurement of the extent of the firm's output bias. The larger the value of b, the more willing the firm manager is to forego profit in order to obtain a higher output level. If b Å 0, the SOE is a conventional profit-maximizing firm.
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Our results do not depend qualitatively on the ''quantity-drive'' assumption embodied in (3). In fact, any significant nonprofit motives for the SOE, e.g., higher employment, higher output/worker ratio, and higher capital/labor ratio, give rise to the higher-productivity-lower-efficiency outcome we shall derive and, hence, make TFP a questionable measure of SOE performance. By differentiating totally p(Q) in (2), we obtain the relationship between profit and output depending on the production technology as dp dQ
Let Q p be the output level that maximizes profit: i.e., p(Q p ) Å 0, or, from
This technologically determined relationship between output and profit gives the feasibility constraint for the SOE's optimization problem. To maintain a given utility level, the marginal rate of substitution between p and Q must satisfy the condition
where U i is the partial derivative of U with respect to its ith argument. Given the special form of the utility function in (3), we can write dp
A conventional profit-maximizing firm has b Å 0 so that U 2 Å 0 and dp/dQ Å 0; i.e., the utility loss due to a lower profit cannot be compensated by a higher output level. The SOE with an output bias has b ú 0 and dp/dQ Å 0b, meaning that a loss in utility due to one unit loss of profit can be compensated by 1/b units of output. At the optimum, the marginal rates of transformation and substitution must be equal. Therefore,
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the SOE's optimization problem.
Alternatively, we can substitute p into (3) and obtain
which is identical to the condition above. The second-order condition is obviously satisfied since cЉ(r) ú 0. Two observations arise from (6). First, while a profit-maximizing firm with b Å 0 chooses the output level where marginal cost is equal to the marginal product, i.e., c/A Å 1, the SOE with an output bias produces more at which c/A Å 1 / b ú 1. Furthermore, the magnitude of deviation from the profit-maximizing level of output increases with b. Second, for both types of firms, the optimal output level is positively related to productivity measured by A. Before continuing, we emphasize the rationale for the assumption that changes in A are exogenous to our model. Our purpose is to examine the consequences of higher productivity, increases in A, FIG. 1. p is the profit; Q is the output; A 0 and A 1 are two alternative productivity levels. The inverted-U curves represent two alternative p-Q trade-off schedules. The parallel straight lines are indifference curves of the manager. p 0 is the profit level associated with the optimal choice given A 0 and p 1 is that given A 1 . The graph illustrates that p 1 õ p 0 ; i.e., higher productivity gives rise to lower profit. regardless of origin. An increase in A does not indicate that the manager is maximizing profit. In fact, a quantity-driven manager is as interested in a higher A as is a profit-maximizing manager, since a higher A increases output. In other words, increases in A are consistent with our behavioral assumption of non-profit-maximizing.
CONSEQUENCES OF PRODUCTIVITY INCREASE
In this section, we use our simple model to study the consequences of an observed productivity increase. First, we show that given the firm's nonprofit-maximizing behavior, higher productivity may result in lower profits. Second, when market demand is sufficiently elastic, higher productivity leads to lower social welfare.
Productivity Increase and Profitability
To isolate the effect of higher productivity, we assume that the price w is not distorted and that both the market for the output and that for the input are competitive. A higher productivity level, i.e., a larger A, means that any given amount of output is now produced with less input, or, equivalently, a given amount of input can produce more output. Consequently, profit is higher at every output level and the curve p(Q) in Fig. 1 is shifted upward for Q ú 0. It is immediately clear, graphically, that the equilibrium profit level of a conventional firm, i.e., a profit maximizer, will be higher. However, what happens to the profitability of the SOE with output bias, i.e., b ú 0, is ambiguous. In the following, we derive formally this result and give the condition under which the equilibrium profit level of the firm with an output bias declines with improved productivity.
From (3), we obtain dp dA
By the envelope theorem,
Differentiating (6) with respect to A, we have
Thus, dp/dA can be rewritten as dp dA
where (6) is used to obtain the second equality.
In (7), setting b Å 0, we have dp/dA ú 0. However, if b ú 0, the sign of dp/dA is ambiguous. Thus, we state the following proposition. PROPOSITION 1. (1) If b Å 0, dp/dA ú 0; i.e., for a profit-maximizing firm, higher productivity means higher profit. (2) If b ú 0, the effect of productivity on profit is ambiguous.
Next, we show that dp/dA õ 0, if b is sufficiently large. In other words, if the output bias of the firm is sufficiently strong, improved productivity, i.e., a higher A, leads to a lower equilibrium profit level, i.e., a smaller p. We first define y Å Q/A and report two lemmas, the proofs of which are found in the Appendix. LEMMA 1.
sign dp dA
.
LEMMA 2. If lim yrϱ c(y) Å ϱ and lim yrϱ y(cЉ(y)/[c(y)] 2 ) exists, the latter limit cannot be positive, i.e., lim yrϱ y(cЉ(y)/[c(y)]
2 ) £ 0.
PROPOSITION 2. There exists b and b U with
dp/dA õ 0; if b £ b, dp/dA ú 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
To illustrate further this result, consider the special case of a Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to scale. This specification is assumed in most of the empirical work on productivity analysis. Let the production function be Q Å Ax 1/a with a ú 1. The firm's cost function can be written as
Therefore, c(y) Å ay a01 and (6) can be rewritten as
Note also that
Substituting the expressions for Q/A and cЉ(y) into dp/dA and simplifying lead to dp dA Intuitively, the potential negative relationship between productivity and profitability results from equilibrium profit being determined by both productivity and the firm's behavior, reflected in its choice of output level. However, productivity also affects the firm's behavior as manifested by its choice of the output level. If b ú 0, the equilibrium output level is higher than the one that maximizes profit and the degree of deviation depends on the marginal rate of transformation, that, in turn, depends on productivity. At the profitmaximizing output level Q p , dp/dQ Å 0; i.e., output can be increased with no corresponding loss in profit and the ''quantity-driven'' firm moves to a higher output level. As output increases, each additional unit yields an increasing loss in profit due to the decreasing marginal rate of transformation. The trade-off is no longer worthwhile when the marginal rates of transformation and substitution are equal.
As is clear from (4), higher productivity, i.e., a higher A, means that, at every given Q, an additional unit of output above Q p can be obtained at less foregone cost of profit. This has two consequences. First, the profit of the firm is higher at any given output level, which we call the direct effect of a productivity gain on profitability. This effect contributes positively to profit. Second, since producing an additional unit of output now involves a smaller corresponding loss of profit, the firm finds it worthwhile to deviate further from the profit-maximizing output level, which leads to a lower profit. We call this the induced, or behavioral, effect of a productivity gain on profitability. The opposing signs of the direct and induced effects of higher productivity on profit explain why the net effect of higher productivity on profitability is, in general, ambiguous, as shown in Proposition 1. When b is small, the change in output deviation from the profitmaximizing level is small and the direct effect dominates, yielding dp/dA ú 0. The opposite is true when b is large.
A heuristic discussion of the comparative statics of b follows. Given a fixed A, a higher b means that the SOE is deviating farther from profit maximization and thus it generates more distortion in the decision. When A increases, e.g., one firm becomes two firms, the distortion is simply magnified. Eventually, when b is high enough, the magnified distortion will be larger than the normal efficiency gain associated with a higher A.
Productivity Increase and Social Welfare
The overall effect of productivity change on social welfare depends on the choice of social welfare criterion. Consider a simple notion of social welfare, namely, the sum of enterprise profit and consumer surplus. Such a textbook approach can be justified by observing that, one way or the other, the profit of the SOE is eventually distributed to the population. 8 In other words, our simple social welfare criterion is not sensitive to the distribution of income, but is based rather on aggregate utility in the economy. Given this simple standard, the only missing piece is the effect of higher productivity on changes in consumer surplus. 9 An increase in TFP has the unambiguous effect of increasing the output level and lowering the price of the product regardless of the value of b. This implies, unambiguously, that consumers are not worse off with a productivity improvement. The magnitude of the gain in consumer surplus decreases with the price elasticity of demand; it is higher when demand is less elastic and approaches zero when demand is perfectly elastic. This result is independent of the value of b.
The potentially opposing signs of the change in profit and consumer surplus leave the overall effect of higher productivity on social welfare ambiguous. Therefore, in general, an improvement in productivity cannot be equated to an increase in social welfare. It is also inappropriate, without qualification, to view improved productivity as an indicator of improved performance or ''progress'' because such an indicator neglects the way in which the output level and financial performance of the firm are affected by productivity. Specifically, when the price elasticity of the demand is sufficiently elastic and b sufficiently large, a higher productivity actually leads to a lower social welfare.
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
Based on a simple model, we have argued that, under certain conditions, productivity analysis is misleading for gauging the performance of state enterprises because higher productivity may lead to lower efficiency. The key remaining question is whether or not such conditions are applicable to Chinese state enterprises. In this section, we argue that they are valid by considering empirical findings and institutional observations. Before examining the empirical evidence to support our theory, it is necessary to discuss alternative explanations of the observation that has motivated our theory, namely, higher productivity and lower profitability of Chinese SOEs following the reform. Although our theory is concerned directly with the validity of productivity as an index for SOE performance, two explanations have been proffered for this phenomenon. First, during the reform period, the entry of nonstate enterprises into markets intensified competition in both product and labor markets. As a result, profit margins were driven down as was the state enterprises' profitability. Second, reduced profitability of SOEs is an accounting phenomenon since, in the wake of the reform, the share of the insider, i.e., workers and managers, in the total cash flow is higher than it was prior to the reform.
10 For example, wages and bonuses may have increased faster than sales revenues. In the extreme case, managers may have diverted enterprise profits to their own businesses using transfer prices.
Although both theories may explain much of the poor financial performance of Chinese SOEs despite their improved productivity, each is incomplete. Note that both explanations imply that SOEs' decisions are essentially efficient. A large body of anecdotal evidence indicates that distortionary operational decisions, such as those based on output maximization, are responsible for poor performance. A representative case is China's textile industry (Pen, 1994) . Since the early 1980's, that industry has been growing at a rapid rate of 12% per year due both to entry of new firms into the market and to the expansion of existing SOEs. In 1992, total output was 1.3 times higher than that in 1980 that in . However, between 1990 , almost all SOEs in the textile industry were losing money; nonetheless, there was a 25% surplus in aggregate productive capacity. By 1994, the Chinese central government faced with the increasing financial burden of subsidizing these unprofitable enterprises decided to force many antiquated SOEs to decrease production and retire obsolete production equipment. According to the latest report in 1996 (People's Daily, 1996b), such efforts have met with only limited success as overcapacity remains and overproduction continues. The result is the continuation of significant financial losses for SOEs in the textile industry. That other industries face a similar problem is witnessed by the central government calling repeatedly for SOEs to decrease production and reduce output inventory (so-called Xian Chan Ya Ku). As recently as September 1996, the State Economic and Trade Commission, which is the central government agency in charge of SOEs, issued a decree that, in a harsh tone, ordered local governments to ''pay great attention to reduce production of those SOEs facing mounting inventories or having excessive delayed payments'' (People's Daily, 1996a, p. 1). Clearly, output maximization policies are still pursued by SOEs despite years of attempted reform.
More direct empirical evidence pertaining to SOE behavior found in existing enterprise-level studies forms the basis for predictions derived from our theory. In a study of the emerging managerial market in China, Groves et al. (1995) examine the incentives of SOE managers and find that managerial compensation is more closely linked to firm profit after the reforms.
11 However, ''sales were a strong factor and profits were a weaker factor in explaining managerial wages'' (Groves et al., 1995, p. 887) . Consequently, managers are likely to have paid significant attention to output targets. In another study, Dong and Tang (1995) analyze questionnaires issued to the managers of 769 SOEs in 1990. Among the questions asked was the following: ''Why do you continue making profit losing products?'' The most frequent answers in descending order of frequency were: (1) it is due to government instructions, (2) we have no better technology, and (3) we have to maintain employment. When asked about their reactions to situations in which market supply exceeds market demand, managers most commonly replied: (1) we will not reduce production, as reducing production is more costly than reducing prices, (2) we will not reduce output since it violates government instructions, and (3) we will not reduce output until the market is stabilized. The authors thus conclude: ''. . . SOEs have not yet assigned profit a proper weight in their objectives. . . . In recent years, many SOEs continue producing when the market is soft, causing enormous increases in inventories and occupying large amounts of capital'' (Dong and Tang, 1995, p. 283) . Finally, in a recent study of Chinese state-owned construction units, Parker (forthcoming) finds evidence of increasing overuse of capital and labor. From 1985 to 1991, the shadow-to-observed price ratio of capital decreased from 1.171 to 0.709. This same ratio for labor decreased from 0.645 to 0.632 (Parker, forthcoming, Table 6 ). Again, the evidence suggests that our quantity-driven behavioral hypothesis does describe the behavior of the managers of Chinese SOEs during the reform.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper is not concerned with whether previous research has misestimated productivity growth of Chinese SOEs. Rather, it argues that the concept of productivity, as conventionally defined, may not be the appropriate measure for SOE performance during the reform. Specifically, using a simple model in the spirit of a counterexample, we show that as long as SOEs are not pure profit maximizers, even though they may be cost minimizers, it may well be the case that increases in productivity actually lead to lower economic efficiency. Based on both anecdotal evidence and existing empirical studies, we argue that this distressing scenario is unfortunately applicable to far too many Chinese SOEs.
One important implication is that the large volume of empirical work based on production function analysis of Chinese reform and related results must now be reinterpreted with care. TFP growth rate is not the ultimate index, or the bottom-line indicator, for judging the success of reform. A more troubling implication is that the large amount of research comparing the relative success of various reform programs based on induced productivity increases may not contain robust conclusions.
APPENDIX

A1. Proof of Lemma 1
Substituting b Å [c(y)/A] 0 1 (from (6)) into (7), we obtain dp dA [g(x)/x]dx is a constant. Therefore c(y) õ 0 as y is large enough, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
A3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Lemma 1 says that sign (dp/dA) Å sign [ycЉ ( 
